

Between fear and hope



Jean Monnet in Dutch Politics in 2008

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Juni 2008

Masterclass Montesquieu Instituut

INTRODUCTION

The image of the Netherlands has always been that of a very pro-European country. They were among the six countries that laid the foundations of the present European Union. Particularly after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the 2005 referendum this image has changed. In this essay I will look more closely at the idealism that underpinned the very start of the European cooperation: with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, and especially the founding father of it: Jean Monnet. He distinguished two sorts of dynamics: of fear and hope. Firstly, I will examine what he exactly meant by that. After that, we will see what we recognize from his idealism in Dutch politics nowadays.

JEAN MONNET: DYNAMICS OF FEAR AND HOPE

The man who is regarded by many as the chief architect of European Unity knew very well the dangers of war and oppression. Jean Monnet (1888-1979) himself didn't only see the cruelties of the First World War but also the dramatic slaughter of the Second World War, not to mention the Armenian genocide or the ethnic cleansing in Russia or the Balkans. Only days before the outbreak of the First World War the British Foreign Minister would have said: "The lamps are going out all over Europe. We shall not see them lit again in our time" (cited in: Koch 2001:209). One could argue that the lights were only on again after the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, but although that seems plausible to say, one could also very well argue that at least that the first sunbeams prudently broke through with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. Monnet, the man behind this revolutionary concept, saw this organization as a first attempt to bring peace and welfare to the European continent by means of institutionalized cooperation that would in the end even prevent the participating countries to go to war. Of course Monnet was not the only thinker after the Second World War who promoted European cooperation. Many other movements and organizations promoted a new Europe in which cooperation would be the way to tackle their problems, not violence. The debates however were quite vague and lacked a clearly devised plan or common goal. The European Union of Federalists for example aimed at a Federal Europe in which the participating states would in fact give up their sovereignty and form a United States of Europe. In contrast, the United

Europe Movement, founded in 1947 by Winston Churchill, advocated only European cooperation without giving up sovereignty of the states. The Congress of The Hague that was held in 1948 didn't provide a clear outcome and its only real achievement was the establishment of the very intergovernmental Council of Europe in 1949¹.

So it seems fair to say that there was a widespread consensus about the general and quite vague ideal of European cooperation, but no agreement on the scope and exact nature of that cooperation. But everyone agreed that this was the momentum for Europe to move forward and leave war and destruction behind. And Monnet was the great driving force behind the efforts to bring about European Unity.

He distinguished two dynamics that could underpin the future development of Europe: fear and hope. Two years before the founding of the ECSC he expressed the need for more cooperation in Europe in a written reflection in which he said that "... les pays d'Europe ont peur et cherchent de l'aide" (Monnet: 1950).

That fear was indeed widespread among politicians, for several reasons. First there was the developing Cold War between the United States and the USSR. For Europe the involvement of the USA was inevitable because of the fragile defence forces that Britain and France had after the war, no to mention the fact that Germany was completely defeated. So it is not strange that most countries turned to the USA instead of focusing on purely European solution. In fact, the mere existence of NATO was a precondition for all forms of European cooperation that would take place.

But there was fear as well for the eventual re-emergence of Germany. It was inevitable that Germany's economy would recover, and probably very quickly. This was especially a concern for France, since they had fought three bloody wars in less than seventy years with Germany. The French acknowledged that Germany's recovery would eventually also benefit France, but only in a restricted way, through a supranational authority which could contain possible German aspirations.

However, in the short run the big fear didn't come from the nations on the European continent. The European states had lost their war capacity for at least a decade and the economy was almost completely destroyed. The big danger came from the East.

Because of the emerging Cold War between the USSR and the United States, two alliances quickly developed: the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The formation of NATO in 1949 was extremely important for the development of the idea of European integration: "It provided a protective shield behind which western Europe was free to consider its political and economic options". (Unwin, 2002:4). The alliance in which

Western Europe had placed itself was in fact the underlying precondition for any form of European integration. As Koch argues, “European integration could only get going when the sting of mutual war was removed between the West-European states” (Koch 2001:216-217).

So in short, it was only under the umbrella of the American protection that Europe could work on its own internal integration project. And in the analysis of Monnet, that Europe was at a crossroads around the beginning 1950s. He was afraid that, after a destructive war, the nations of Europe would again rely on their pre-war reflexes as sovereign nation states, with a big emphasis on national defence and nationalism. In his years as deputy-Secretary-General of the League of Nations and during whole the Interbellum, he had seen with his own eyes the complete failure of the interstate cooperation on the European continent after the First World War. Moreover, national sentiments were usually enhanced by the experience of war and resistance, at least among the populations. The Norwegian, Luxembourg, Dutch and English Royal Houses, pre-eminently national symbols, were extremely popular after the Second World War because of their role during wartime.

On the elite level however, the general idea of a strongly needed integration on European level was widely supported: “The issue was no longer whether there should be integration, but what form it should take” (Unwin, 2002:4). And Monnet, who knew the European elite very well, tried to gain support for his idea of pooling the steel and coal productions of the old rivals France and Germany, as a starting point for an eventual federation of Europe. To overcome the old European dynamics of fear, he saw France as the leading nation in Europe: “La France est désignée par le destin. Si elle prend l’initiative qui éliminera la crainte, fera renaître l’espoir dans l’avenir, rendra possible la création d’une force de paix, elle aura libéré l’Europe” (Monnet, 1950).

It was of course an extremely ambitious attempt to try to overcome the catastrophic dynamics that underpinned the international order since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. For Monnet, this meant that the dynamics of fear should be replaced by a dynamics of hope. In his discourse, hope was closely linked with change: “Il faut une action profonde, réelle, immédiate et dramatique qui change les choses et fasse entrer dans la réalité les espoirs auxquels les peuples sont sur le point de ne plus croire” (Monnet, 1950).

For Monnet, hope for the continent was closely linked with a profound change in how the game was played in the international arena on the continent. If peace was to be secured, states had to give up essential parts of their sovereignty by means of transferring them to a higher, supranational level. This change would also bring about trust in themselves, as a free and peaceful Europe would develop. And, last but not least, if Europe would succeed, then Europe would become eventually a “force d’équilibre” (Monnet, 1950) next to the United States.

Although the European leaders faced enormous challenges, both internally and externally, that big change that Monnet envisaged didn’t happen. European leaders agreed that cooperation on the continent was inevitable and necessary, but the idealism of Monnet was far too elitist to gain widespread support among the European politicians. In fact, they sought to safeguard their own national interest, by means of European cooperation. Milward even argued in his famous book *The European Rescue of the Nation State* that the European project facilitated the survival of nation states, instead of making them disappear. In fact the old dynamics remained prominent in European politics. The dynamics of fear and hope that Monnet distinguished turned out to be a wonderful and inspiring idealism, but not very viable in the aftermath of the Second World War. This became visible in the pragmatism of Monnet’s idea for the ECSC. In fact, the pooling of coal and steel seemed to contrast with the wonderful rhetoric of a United States of Europe. But in fact Monnet believed that in the end a Federation would develop, albeit slowly and sector-by-sector². This incremental, quite technical approach made the Schuman Plan (issued by the French Foreign Minister, but in fact drafted by Monnet himself) acceptable for the Benelux countries. A sudden imposition of a supranational European Federation would have been far too ambitious.

With the benefit of hindsight, Monnet ambitions and idealism proved to be more an academic exercise than a realistic option for the continent. The dynamics of the European integration process that started after the Second World War and were far more complex than the simple distinction that Monnet made between the dynamics of hope and that of fear. The context of European politics remained determined by the structures of the nation state and the establishment of the Haute Autorité was counterbalanced by the Council of Minister, primarily on the instigation of the Benelux countries. The Dutch Prime Minister Drees for example was very reluctant to give sovereignty away to what he called the experts in the High Authority. He also

feared that Europe would be dominated by Catholics (Koole en Raap, 2005:114, in: Vollaard en Boer, 2005).

If we could speak of a dynamics of hope after the Second World War, it would be the common drive to solve problems in a European way and on a European level, but not a dynamics of hope in which cooperation would eventually lead to federation, as Monnet envisaged. One could even argue that his functionalist method not only contributed to the EU's success, but also to his problems and failures, especially with relation to supposed democratic deficit of the Union (Warleigh 2004; 19).

As Milward argues, "ironically, the argument that the European Union mainly owes its existence to individuals of persistent and fervent vision, who have been set on making it the central organ of a European federation, remains as one established explanation of the supranation's incomplete existence, although neither political science nor history give that argument much credence" (Milward 2006:103, in: Jørgensen et al., 2006).

But in short, the Schuman Plan and Monnet's idealism set the tone in the post-war era, although no member state aimed a federal Europe from the beginning. Europe broke new ground that eventually produced the European Union.

HOPE AND FEAR: EUROPE IN DUTCH POLITICS

A few months after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the Dutch and French voters, the Dutch Foreign Minister Ben Bot used in an article in the French *Le Figaro* Monnet's distinction between the dynamics of fear and hope. He said that it seemed that "nous soyons aujourd'hui sous l'emprise de la peur". The period of reflexion that the European Council announced after the defeat of the Constitutional Treaty should be used, according to Mr. Bot, to bring back the dynamics of hope into the European cooperation. However, in the very same article he stated that the no-vote of the Dutch and French was not "un rejet de l'idée européenne" (Le Figaro, October 25th 2005). That brings us to the core question of this section: what is the State of the European Union in Dutch politics in 2008? Do we recognize Monnet's dynamics of fear, or is that an exaggeration of reality? To answer this question, I will analyse the positions of the main political parties and the position of the Dutch government, by means of their official programmes and their contribution in the public debate.

Firstly I will analyse the different positions of the main parties in the Dutch political spectrum. Do they support the federal idealism, which Monnet connected with the dynamics of hope, or do they turn more to the nation state as a means to solve problems, which Monnet saw as dynamics of fear? Or is there a way in-between? According to research by De Beus and Pennings (2004), Europe has long been much neglected in the election programmes, although De Beus observes a change in recent years (De Beus 2006). Especially after the dramatic no-vote in the referendum of 2005, parties are paying more attention to Europe and the European Union in their programmes. This makes it possible to analyse in detail the general attitude and context in which the different parties place themselves³.

Alongside the three biggest parties in parliament, the Christian Democrats, the Labour Party and the Liberal VVD, also the SP and PVV are analysed because of their sceptic attitude towards the European Union, as well as D66 because of their distinct pro-European attitude, and the Christian Union, since they are in the government since February 22nd 2007.

After that, we will also analyse the position of the government, the Dutch Head of State and the public opinion.

CDA

The biggest party represented in Parliament, the Christian Democrats, have always been among the most enthusiastic supporters of European unity on the continent. Especially the Catholics in the party are very internationally orientated and worked together in Catholic Movements in Europe. The Protestant parties (first in the ARP and CHU) were in the beginning more reserved towards the idea of European integration, but soon they too developed a pro-European line and supported the European ideas of federalism and integration (Vollaard en Boer, 2005:154). They also fully supported the Constitutional Treaty and campaigned actively for it in 2005 during the referendum in the Netherlands. In their election program for the national elections in 2006 they still have a very positive position towards the Union: “By means of the European Union, The Netherland has become much more prosperous and it has got an equal position besides the big countries. European cooperation should not only be seen trough the financial payments. That could hamper the unanimous European approach to the challenges of this time”. It stresses the shared values of the Union, and the importance of human rights, democracy and the need for

a European strategy for immigration, terrorism and the energy supply. On the one hand, the need for subsidiarity is expressed, to make sure that the decision-making takes places on the appropriate level, but on the other hand the program states that there should be more QMV in the area of foreign affairs and defence, which would mean that the Netherlands would lose their right of veto on this matter.

However, in the program nothing is said about the possible goal of the European process of integration: should it be a federation or a super state, or more like the way it is now, as a complex mix of supranational and intergovernmental features?

But in general, the biggest party in Parliament and the government has a very positive attitude towards not only European integration, but also the European Union as a means to bring about that integration on the continent. They fully support the idea of 'an ever closer union', as stated in the Maastricht Treaty (1992).

Nevertheless, although the party strongly supports the European Union, the discourse has changed a little. According to the spokesman for European affairs, Mr. Ormel, the party stands for a 'eurorealistic' course and that criticizing the EU is good for a healthy debate, although the same document states that we can be 'proud of Europe' (Brochure CDA, 2008).

PvdA

The Dutch Labour Party took a somewhat different stance towards the European Union, although they supported the ECSC from the beginning. The Prime Minister in the first decade after the Second World War Drees saw even a Catholic conspiracy in the ECSC (Monnet, Adenauer, Spinelli, Spaak and Schuman were all Catholics). But Drees was an exception in the Labour Party (Koole and Raap, 2005:114 in Vollaard en Boer, 2005). The PvdA viewed European integration, with supranational features, in the light of international solidarity. Although the party became more reticent towards Europe in the polarised 1970s, especially because of the lack of social politics in the Union, they became more positive again under the leadership of Wim Kok. But at the same time they became more realistic and less idealistic towards the federalist ideals that they once accepted with open arms. A Special Committee in the party concluded in 1996 that "it became clear that our federalist ideals are incompatible with the historical task of unifying Europe" (cited in: Bos, 2004). Moreover, party leader Wouter Bos gave a speech in *Le Club du Jeudi* in 2004 that bore the significant title "Beyond federalism: a new realism for Europe". This more realistic approach, without

completely giving up idealism about the European project, was partly a result of the dramatic loss in the 2002 elections.

The current official point of view of the Labour Party still has a rather realistic character. It states among others that “a political union is not an end in itself”(PvdA 2006). And: “The Netherlands have to remain The Netherlands”. Compared to the Christian Democrats, they strike an even more realistic note. But the politicians on a national level still are optimistic about the European Union. The State Secretary for European Affairs and Labour politician Mr. Timmermans for example finds that “asking for a European Dream could be an interesting exercise” (Timmermans, 2007).

VVD

The stance of the liberal VVD in the Dutch parliament was in the beginning of the European integration in the 1950s in fact a rather pragmatic one. They payed lip service to the ideal of a federalist Europe, but they were afraid to delegate any national sovereignty (Boer, 2005:136). They attached great importance to cooperation and security in the Atlantic framework. They had a more positive attitude however to the free trade zone that the Treaty of Rome in the end envisaged.

In fact, until the 1980s the official position remained quite ambiguous. Supranational elements were greeted only as they served the Dutch interest. This changed under the leadership of Frits Bolkestein in the 1990s, as the VVD became more outspoken eurosceptic. He saw the European cooperation particularly as economic cooperation, and the Treaty of Maastricht was for him in fact the final destination of the European project. This eurosceptic stance is still visible on the Liberal Manifesto that the party issued in 2005. It states among other that “the dream of a federal Europe (...) has failed. The VVD is glad with that. The nation-state The Netherlands should be preserved and Europe’s strength lies in its diversity” (VVD, 2005). And the VVD website explicitly states that “the VVD doesn’t want ‘superstate Europe’”.

In general, the federal idealism of Monnet is not supported by the VVD.

D66

Beyond any doubt D66, currently one of the smallest parties in parliament, can be considered as the most pro-European party in parliament since their foundation in 1966. They even called themselves “good pupils of Monnet” (cited in Boer, 2005:144, in: Vollaard 2005). In fact, there is much truth in that. In their election program of

2006 they state explicitly that “D66 chooses for a federal Europe”. They support a European army and a coherent foreign and security policy for the EU. The only worries they have about Europe is the lack of democracy and transparency. D66 was one of the big supporters of the referendum about the Constitutional Treaty, to bring more legitimacy into the process of integration.

In general, D66 fully acknowledges the need for the dynamics of hope in the European integration process, by transferring national sovereignty to a supranational European level, not only in the area of the economy or the EMU, but also on defence and foreign policy areas.

SP

As an originally Marxist party, the Socialist Party pursued at the outset a strong anti-capitalist policy. Because of this position, they rejected every form of cooperation between capitalist countries, of which they say the European Union as an example. They gradually developed a more pragmatic line, particularly after they got two seats in parliament after the 1994 elections. They accepted the European Union as a *fait accompli*, but still saw and see it as a neoliberal project. They enthusiastically campaigned against the Constitutional Treaty, because the European Union would “develop to a European superstate with a flag, anthem, currency, monetary policy and aspirations for one foreign and security policy” (website SP). The SP supports the general idea of European cooperation, but not a European Union that “dictates law and imposes rules, that go against the desire of the majority of the citizens” (website SP).

It is clear that the SP, currently with 25 seats in the Dutch parliament, doesn’t support the idealism of Monnet. On the contrary, the European discourse of the SP is especially nourished by fear. Fear for a European superstate, a too powerful Brussels or a “megalomaniac Constitution” (SP 2006).

PVV

Receiving their first seats in parliament after the 2006 elections, the PVV displays a very eurosceptic attitude towards European integration and the European Union. Their lack of a coherent and profound ideology doesn’t prevent hem from taking a very firm position towards the European Union. They emphasize the sovereignty of the nation and the threat that comes from Brussels. They advocate a small Europe with right of

veto for all member states, and reject strongly a federal approach. In their pamphlet for the 2006 election they even propose the abolition of the European Parliament (PVV 2006).

Their position is not very different from that of the Socialist Party, albeit that both parties have their very own reasons for rejecting the idea of a federal Europe.

Christian Union

After the merger of the orthodox Protestant GPV and RPF into the Christian Union in 2002, the Christian Union changed their attitude towards the EU slightly (Vollaard 2005;166). Originally the GPV and RPF were reticent about European integration, especially of the concentration of power. This euroscepticism has now changed in a sort of eurorealism. They acknowledge fully the “great value of the European project” (Election program Christian Union 2006). They do not however support a federal Europe: “As far as the Christian Union is concerned, the final end of the European Union has largely been achieved”. The fact that they voted in favour of the Treaty of Lisbon shows that they evolved from a rather eurosceptic party to a more eurorealistic party, although the idealism of Monnet and his federal Europe is not shared by the party.

Government

In the so-called coalition agreement, agreed upon by the Christian Democrats, the Labour Party and the Christian Union in February 2007, the three parties also devoted a paragraph to Europe, albeit a rather vague one. The government “commits itself to good cooperation” in Europe, and emphasizes the principle of subsidiarity. Compared with for example the Belgian coalition agreement of March 2008⁴, it is a rather superficial text and not very ambitious. Nothing is said about the *finalité* of the Union, or whether the European Union should develop to the federation that Monnet foresaw. The current State Secretary for European Affairs Mr. Timmermans and the Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Verhagen called it a “sensible and realistic course” in the annual State of the European Union 2008 (TK 31202, p.5). Especially after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty the government tries to regain confidence in European integration.

The Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende as member of the European Council holds a positive attitude towards the European Union. After the signing of the

Constitutional Treaty he saw this as the start of a new era (Church and Phinnemore, 2007:47, in: Cini 2007). One year before the rejection of the Treaty in the referendum, he approvingly quoted the American author Jeremy Rifkin, who said that “a new European Dream is being born” and in the very same speech he even called Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, president of the European Convention which drafted the Constitutional Treaty, “‘our’ James Madison”⁵. His idealism has not disappeared after the rejection of the same Constitutional Treaty. In a speech before the European Parliament in 2007 he quoted the Schuman Declaration of May 9th 1950 and he also said that Schuman’s words can indicate direction in “our common goal to build further on Europe”⁶. Monnet’s dynamics of hope seem to be very present in the discourse of the Prime Minister, although he has become more prudent after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the 2005 referendum.

Head of State

In this context, the position of the Dutch Head of State, Queen Beatrix, is remarkable. Although she is to remain out of the realm of politics having a largely symbolic function, she has spoken out many times in favour of European integration and unity. Before the European Parliament she even complained about the lack of idealism about Europe: “European integration has taken convincing shape, and has become part of our lives. But there is little evidence nowadays of the idealism that gripped us then” (2004). As president of the European Working Group in the 1960s, she was already inspired by the European ideal. The chairman of the Working Group, Mr. [Alting von Geusau](#), said not long ago about the group: “We all regret that the European spirit has disappeared. The unity has gone far less than the federally organised Europe that we had in mind at the time” (ND April 30th 2008).

In 1996 Queen Beatrix even received the prestigious international *Karlspreis* for her commitment to European unity. Past recipients of the Prize include Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and Bill Clinton. It is beyond doubt that Queen Beatrix has been the most constant factor in the Dutch government when it comes to support for the idealism of Monnet as a founding father of the European Union.

Public opinion

It is striking that the support for the European Union among the Dutch citizens is one of the highest in Europe. In the *Eurobarometer* held in The Netherlands just after the

referendum, 82 percent of the population were of the opinion that membership of the European Union was a good thing. Only 8 percent of those who were against the Constitutional Treaty voted no because they were against European integration, although 19 percent feared a loss of national sovereignty (*Eurobarometer 172*). The picture is still positive in the latest *Eurobarometer*: 79 percent thinks that the membership of the European Union is a good thing; only Luxembourg has a higher rate with 82 percent in favour.

This positive attitude of the Dutch does not mean however that the idealism of Monnet and his dynamics of hope is something that the Dutch are very enthusiastic about. The vast majority would in fact not even know his name, let alone his ideas. The European idealism has always been an elite project; something where Monnet was especially criticized for because of his incremental and step-by-step approach, out of the eye of the public and mainly taking place in the offices of technocrats and insiders. Seen in this light, the support of the Dutch citizens for the Union in general is in fact overwhelming, especially taking into account the (supposed) democratic deficit and the rather bureaucratic organisations in Brussels and Strasbourg.

CONCLUSION

The question arises: are we indeed « sous l'emprise de la peur », as Mr. Bot said? Unquestionably, Europe has become less self-evident and less taken for granted in Dutch politics. Some parties in parliament indeed cultivate the fear that the EU causes a lot of trouble and takes our jobs away (the famous Polish plumber). But the vast majority accepts the EU as a given and supports in fact the need for European cooperation.

To call this idealism would not be very accurate, but it wouldn't be very accurate either to say that the Dutch therefore are imprisoned by a dynamics of fear. A big majority in Dutch Parliament supported the Lisbon Treaty, and does support the European Union, as does the Dutch population. Even the most eurosceptic parties in Parliament, the SGP and PVV, do not plead for leaving the EU.

Perhaps Queen Beatrix was right when she said that “the European integration has been so successful that one hardly realises it anymore”⁷. Most probably Monnet would have been very proud of what has been reached. What has happened between the Treaties of Rome and the Treaty of Lisbon is in fact more than remarkable seen in

the light of what happened between the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaties of Rome. The EU now has 27 members, an aggregate population of about 493 million people, and an economy that generates 30 percent of world gross product.

There is still idealism in the debate, although it is a different idealism than Monnet's dynamics of hope, which he linked to a federal Europe. The F-word (federalism) is hardly mentioned anymore, but politicians still value European cooperation in the European Union very much. In a way, a less high-flown discourse may be good for the public debate about Europe, although it is dangerous to take support for the European Union for granted. In fact, the main goal of the Schuman Plan has been realised: peace and security on the continent. And in their own words: "Europe will not be made at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a *de facto* solidarity".

In brief, one could say that Monnet and his federal dream is not very viable anymore in Dutch politics. But overall, the dynamics of hope have not been replaced by dynamics of fear. It is perhaps the irony of history that the European project has been such a success that it is taken for granted now by almost all European citizens.

Overall, idealism has been replaced by a more realistic approach in Dutch politics. Taking into consideration the recent rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the Dutch voters, this may well be a healthy development.

NOTES

¹ In October 1948 the European Movement was founded, with as its main goal to implement the resolutions of the Congress of The Hague. The Movement does still exist and is represented in 44 European countries and regroups 23 international Associations. Its objective is to "contribute to the establishment of a united, federal Europe founded on the respect for basic human rights, peace principles, democratic principles of liberty and solidarity and citizens' participation".

² A possible stage in-between would be a confederation, but according to Monnet "'une confédération' mènera un jour à une 'Fédération'" (cited in Hermans 1996: 237)

³ I particularly used the websites of the different parties.

⁴ The Leterme-government explicitly states that "a stronger Europe needs a European Union that deepens and integrates politically". See also: <http://www.premier.be/files/NVERKLARINGtien-zondervoettekst.pdf>

⁵ He said so in a speech at the conference in The Hague about the politics of European values in 2004 (<http://europapoort.eerstekamer.nl/9345000/1/j9vvggy6i0ydh7th/vgbwr4k8ocw2/f=/vhi9n7y45usv.pdf>)

⁶ Speech held before the European Parliament about the future of Europe, on May 23rd 2007 (<http://europapoort.eerstekamer.nl/9345000/1/j9vvggy6i0ydh7th/vgbwr4k8ocw2/f=/vhl7i8ez1zgh.pdf>)

⁷ She said so in her speech on the occasion of her State Visit to Belgium on June 22nd 2006 (<http://www.koninklijkhuis.nl/content.jsp?objectid=16248>)

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VVD

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D66

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SP

Manifesto about Europe:

<http://www.sp.nl/nieuws/nwsoverz/div/eenbetereuropabegintnu.pdf>

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http://www.sp.nl/standpunten/cd_63/standpunt_over_europese_unie.html

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http://www.pvv.nl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=788&Itemid=139

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<http://www.christenunie.nl/nl/page/10893>

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